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The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a controversial 
subject, but at the same time it is perceived to be the most comprehensive inter‑
national agreement on free trade and investment protection. Among the topics 
that evoke criticism on the part of different social groups is the investor‑state 
dispute‑settlement (ISDS), as well as its legal consequences for the EU Member 
states. A less discussed issue is the potential implications of the agreement on the 
state of economic co‑operation between the European Union and the USA in the 
field of investment flows, with special reference to foreign direct investment (FDI). 
The aim of this paper is to present the discussion related to the ISDS and examine 
some of the economic, political and legal implications of TTIP provisions for FDI 
flows between the EU and the USA. The proposals of the European Commission 
to change the investment protection system might be treated as an attempt to make 
the system of arbitrage more transparent and convincing to societies, and safer 
for states. The effects of the TTIP agreement for FDI between both partners might 
be dependent on the scale of trade creation and diversion effects, and the mirror 
effects of investment creation and diversion under a free trade area. 
Keywords: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), investor‑state 
dispute‑settlement (ISDS), foreign direct investment (FDI), USA, UE 
JEL: F21
Janina Witkowska
* Ph.D., Full Professor at the University of Lodz, Institute of Economics, Faculty of Econom‑
ics and Sociology, e‑mail: janwit@uni.lodz.pl
26 Janina Witkowska
1. Introduction
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiated between 
the USA and the EU is a controversial subject. Among the topics that evoke criti‑
cism on the part of different social groups is the investor‑state dispute‑settlement 
(ISDS), as well as its legal consequences for the EU states. A less discussed issue 
is the potential implications of the agreement on the state of economic co‑oper‑
ation between the European Union and the USA in the field of investment flows, 
with special reference to foreign direct investment (FDI). In this context some 
questions arise, namely: 
• What are the arguments for and against the ISDS provisions?
• Would investment protection issues change the policy of both partners to‑
wards FDI? 
• Would agreement’s provisions influence the current state of FDI flows between 
the negotiating partners? and 
• To what extent might creation and diversion investment effects be expected 
as a result of the creation of a free trade area?
The aim of this paper is to answer these questions and to examine some of the 
economic, political and legal implications of TTIP provisions for FDI flows be‑
tween the EU and the USA. 
2. Main provisions of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP)
The idea of a creation of a free trade agreement between the USA and the 
EU has a longer history than just the current efforts aimed at establishing the 
TTIP. The negotiations on Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) failed 
in the 1990s, but the idea of such an agreement remained desirable to politi‑
cians on both sides in the decades that followed (Watts 2016, p. 88). The ne‑
gotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) were 
launched on July 8, 2013. Between July 2013 and October 2016, fifteen Nego‑
tiating Rounds were held, concentrating on the main issues to be settled. The 
official report of both negotiating parties of January 2017 optimistically states 
that: “Our negotiators have made significant strides since 2013, identifying 
landing zones for certain issues, finding common ground on other important 
issues, and clarifying the remaining differences”. (U.S.‑EU Joint Report, 2017). 
Nevertheless, the future of the of TTIP is uncertain under the current political 
conditions.
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The proposal of the TTIP agreement includes three main elements, namely: 
• market access, which means removing customs duties on goods and restric‑
tions on services, gaining better access to public markets, and making it eas‑
ier to invest;
• improved regulatory coherence and cooperation by dismantling unnecessary 
regulatory barriers, such as the duplication of bureaucracy;
• improved cooperation when it comes to setting international standards (EC, 
2015).
The EU has declared that progress in improving conditions for trade and in‑
vestment will not be made at expense of the EU basic values, i.e. high standards 
in the areas of the environment, health and safety, protection of privacy, as well 
as workers’ and consumer rights (EC, 2015, p. 6). It is pointed out that the nego‑
tiating parties, while opening some sectors through ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ lists, 
retain their right to maintain or introduce non‑discriminatory legislation, related 
for instance to:
• standards of treatment for patients; 
• capital requirements for banks; 
• qualification requirements for certain professions; and 
• universal service obligations (EC 2016, p. 4).
Nevertheless, these declarations have not allayed public fears in Europe, which 
are expressed in different ways (See photo 1). 
Photo 1. ’No TTIP’, Alicante/Spain, March 2016
Source: Author’s photo. 
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3. The investment pillar of TTIP
As far as investment is concerned, at least three main issues arise in the context 
of TTIP negotiations, i.e. market access commitment, national treatment commit‑
ment, and standards of investment protection and the issue of resolution of invest‑
ment disputes. The last issue has stirred up strong public concerns in Europe. The 
ISDS is perceived to: 
• limit the policy space of governments, making them be reluctant to introduce 
regulations that might expose them to challenges and financial claims on the 
part of foreign private parties;
• impose restraints on rights of governments to enforce or maintain legisla‑
tion in the public interest (the concept of ‘regulatory chill’) (Bronckers 2015, 
Pyka 2015) 
• be capable of being used by investors to challenge health, environmental and 
social regulations on the grounds that they suffer from arbitrary and abusive 
treatment and/or are victims of ‘indirect expropriation’ (the case of Phillip 
Morris International against Australia), (Pardo 2014)
• be a mechanism which enforces obligations for host countries only (a ‘one–
way instrument’) and affects core government functions (Bottini 2016).
Apart from the above‑mentioned concerns, the hitherto existing ISDS proce‑
dures are perceived as deficient. They are characterized by a lack of transparen‑
cy, inconsistencies in arbitral awards, high costs of procedures, and the existence 
of both parallel and frivolous claims (Pardo 2014). 
In addition, problems relating to the unforeseeability of judgments, slowness of le‑
gal proceedings, and questions concerning the impartiality of judges are discussed 
in the context of public reservations about the mechanism of ISDS (Menkes 2016).
Anticipating the public concerns, the European Commission (EC) suspended negoti‑
ations on the investment pillar of TTIP in 2014 and, following wide public consultations, 
worked out a proposal in this field. The legal basis for such an activity of the EC is the 
Lisbon Treaty, which conferred competence for the protection of investments to the EU. 
This is perceived as an unprecedented opportunity for a profound reform of the tradition‑
al approach to investment protection and the associated ISDS system (EC 2015a).
In its so‑called Concept Paper, the EU identified four areas for further im‑
provement, to wit:
1) protection of the right to regulate;
2) the establishment and functioning of arbitral tribunals;
3) the review of ISDS decisions through an appellate mechanism;
4) the relationship between domestic judicial systems and ISDS (EC 2105a). 
On 16 September 2015, the European Commission presented a new proposal 
on investment protection, which included a proposal to set up an Investment Court 
System (ICS) (EC 2015b). The ICS would replace the existing investor‑state dis‑
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pute‑settlement (ISDS) in all ongoing and future EU investment negotiations, in‑
cluding the TTIP negotiations. The ICS would consist of a first instance Tribunal and 
an Appeal Tribunal. Both these institutions would be composed of individuals ap‑
pointed as “judges” by the contracting parties and subject to strict ethical standards. 
The qualifications of judges should be comparable to those required for the members 
of permanent international courts, such as the International Court of Justice and the 
WTO Appellate Body. The new Appellate Tribunal would operate on principles sim‑
ilar to the WTO Appellate Body. In order to limit unjustified cases, the ability of in‑
vestors to take a case before the Tribunal would be precisely defined. Targeted dis‑
crimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, or nationality, expropriation without 
compensation, or a denial of justice would give investors grounds to institute such 
a procedure. The new system should guarantee governments’ right to regulate.
This proposal was tabled for discussion with the United States and made public 
on 12 November 2015 (EC 2015c). One of the changes made to the 16 September 
proposal consisted of an additional improvement for small and medium‑sized en‑
terprises. They would benefit from faster proceedings and would enjoy privileged 
treatment in comparison with large transnational corporations.
Negotiations on investment protection resumed in February 2016. However, 
the reports on the state of play of the TTIP negotiations, published by the EC after 
the 13th, 14th and 15th rounds of negotiations, did not show any substantial progress 
in this field (EC 2016a, 27 April, EC 2016b, 15 July, EC 2016c, 21 October). 
The EU declared, in a report of October 21, 2016: ‘On investment rules, the dis‑
cussions focused on common provisions (definitions; performance requirements; 
compensation for losses; expropriation; transfers; senior management and board 
of directors; denial of benefits) with the aim of further clarifying the respective 
drafting choices and policy objectives, and identifying further areas of conceptu‑
al convergence. (…) On investment dispute resolution, some progress was made 
in those parts of the respective text proposals on which both sides have similar 
conceptual and textual approaches, or in identifying shared objectives and pos‑
sible future drafting solutions’ (EC 2016c).
The EU proposals related to reform of the hitherto existing ISDS mechanism 
have produced critical responses. The arguments of experts are as follows:
• The newly negotiated EU‑Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agree‑
ment (CETA) and the Agreement with Singapore include both investment 
protection and an investor‑state arbitration clauses. The controversy around 
TTIP can threaten the ratification of these agreements; 
• The EU countries entered without fuss into nearly half of the 3000 bilat‑
eral investment treaties that exist in the world, with arbitration provisions 
as a standard feature;
• The EU proposal could be dismissive of the rules already in place, ’…. exac‑
erbating public fears of the investment arbitral system, rather than reducing 
them.’ (Bishop 2015, p. 7);
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• The EC has unwittingly reinforced concerns about ISDS. Some of the chang‑
es the Commission has proposed weaken both the substantive protection for 
investors and the mechanism the UN system created to enforce these protec‑
tion measures – The Mauritius Convention on Transparency in Treaty‑based 
Investor‑State Arbitration‑ (Chase 2015, p. 226–227);
• It would be beneficial for European investors if the TTIP included ISDS, be‑
cause the US legal system alone is not a dependable safeguard for foreign in‑
vestors, as demonstrated in the Loewen case.1 (Lorz 2014);
The EU proposal to set up an Investment Court System (ICS) has encountered 
critical opinions expressed by two totally different organizations, i.e. the Society 
of German Lawyers (Deutscher Richterbund 2016) and Greenpeace organization 
(Greenpeace 2016).
Generally, the Society of German Lawyers rejected the proposal as having 
neither a legal basis nor being necessary. According to the statement of the Socie‑
ty, the creation of ICS would deprive domestic courts of the possibility to protect 
foreign investors. Particular objections to the proposal are related to, among others, 
the definition of investment. The document uses too wide a definition of invest‑
ment, comprising also bonds, shares in enterprises, intellectual property rights, 
and moveable property. As a consequence, different types of legal regulations can 
be used to judge investors’ claims (civil, social, tax law regulations etc.).
The Society of German Lawyers has also expressed serious doubts about the 
competence of the EU to establishment the Investment Court System, as there 
is no legal basis for such far‑reaching changes in the legal systems of the EU and 
the Member States. Hence, the Investment Court would be located outside the ex‑
isting institutional and legal systems of the EU. The Society does not see any ne‑
cessity for creating a special court for foreign investors, because the EU Member 
States should guarantee the same legal treatment of all entities in their economies. 
Apart from the above‑cited objections, there is also some fear that the independ‑
ence of judges cannot be guaranteed (Deutscher Richterbund 2016).
Greenpeace, in its Position Paper, states that ‘ …the new Proposal substantially 
fails to address and mitigate our concerns on the detrimental impact of ISDS mech‑
anisms on the protection of public interests, such as health and the environment, and 
on the fair and non‑discriminatory access to justice’ (Greenpeace 2016, p. 1). 
According to Greenpeace, under the EU proposal:
• Foreign investors would still benefit from greater rights than domestic inves‑
tors;
• ICS tribunals will not be composed of ‘professional judges’ because at the 
same time they could be arbitrators in ISDS cases under other international 
investment agreements; hence there is a possibility of conflicts of interest;
1 The Loewen case: Case No ARB(AF)/98/3, International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, Washington, D.C. 2003.
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• The ICS will not be subject to the judicial scrutiny of EU supreme and con‑
stitutional courts, hence inconsistency of the ICS’s case law and that of EU 
courts could occur; and the jurisdictions of EU and national courts will be lim‑
ited because a special regime to solve foreign investors’ claims would be es‑
tablished;
• The EC has failed to protect the EU and Member States’ right to regulate in the 
public interest (Greenpeace 2016, p. 1–3).
The arguments presented by these two organizations seem to be reasonable. 
Currently, the idea of a permanent Multilateral Investment Court is under public 
consultation in the EU.2 It would replace the bilateral Investment Court Systems 
included in the recent EU trade and investment agreements. Simultaneously, this 
idea is being discussed in several third countries and international organisations 
dealing with investment, such as UNCTAD, the OECD, UNCITRAL and the 
World Bank (EC 2016d, EC 2016e, EC 2016f, EC 2017).
The proposal for establishment of a permanent Multilateral Investment Court 
is aimed at avoiding the failures of former projects. The Multilateral Investment 
Court should have both first instance and appeal tribunals. Judges should be ten‑
ured, highly qualified, and obliged to adhere to the strictest ethical standards. The 
Multilateral Investment Court would rule on disputes arising under future and 
existing investment treaties. What seems to be important is that the Multilateral 
Investment Court would only apply where an investment treaty already explicit‑
ly allows an investor to bring a dispute against a State, and would not create new 
possibilities for an investor to bring a dispute against a state. The parties in dis‑
pute would be prevented from choosing which judges should rule on their case. 
The Multilateral Investment Court would provide for effective enforcement of its 
decisions and be open to all interested countries to join (EC 2016e). 
4. Recent trends in investor‑state dispute‑settlements (ISDS)
There have been some observations related to usage of ISDS procedures (UNC‑
TAD 2016, pp. 104–107; UNCTAD 2015, pp. 112–117; Lorz 2014). The main facts 
are as follows:
•  The cumulative number of known ISDS cases grew in the years 1987–2016, 
reaching the level of almost 700 (as of 1 January 2016). 
• 107 countries have been respondents to one or more known ISDS claims.
• Developed countries have been the main ISDS users, responsible for 80% 
of all claims. 
2 The consultation was open until 15 March 2017.
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• The relative share of cases against developed countries has remained at about 
40 per cent. 
• Intra‑EU disputes accounted for approximately 19% of all cases globally. 
• The most frequent home States of claimants were (based on total known cases 
as of the end 2015): USA (138), i.e. 20% of the total, the Netherlands (80), the UK 
(59), Germany (51), Canada (39) …. Italy (30)… Turkey (19), Cyprus (18).
• The most frequent respondent States were: Argentina (59 cases), Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela (36), Czech Republic (33), Spain (29), Egypt (24), Can‑
ada (25)….Poland (20), Ukraine (19), India (17). 
• In most cases the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) was used as the arbitral forum.
As for Poland’s experiences with ISDS procedures, the state was the respondent 
in some cases in which the decisions of an international arbitration were beneficial 
to it (for example: ‘Schooner Capital vs Poland’, ‘Minnotte and Lewis vs Poland’). 
In other cases, however, decisions were taken in favour of investors (for example: 
‘Saar Papier Vertriebs GmbH vs Poland’) (Menkes 2016, pp. 149–167).
In general, some new ISDS cases in the global economy concerned public pol‑
icies, including environmental issues, anti‑money laundering and taxation. ISDS 
claims also affected sustainable development sectors. The amounts sought by in‑
vestors ranged from USD 8 million to about USD 2.5 billion, but information re‑
garding this issue is scant. Awards in favour of the investor were justified mainly 
by improper individual decisions by the executive authorities, and only in a small 
fraction of cases by legislative measures.
Investors most frequently challenged four types of State conduct in 2015 
(UNCTAD 2016, p. 106):
• Legislative reforms in the renewable energy sector (at least 20 cases);
• Alleged direct expropriations of investments (at least 6 cases);
• Alleged discriminatory treatment (at least 6 cases);
• Revocation or denial of licenses or permits (at least 5 cases).
All this information suggests that the problem of investment disputes cannot 
be neglected. The EU proposals for creating a transparent, reliable system of dis‑
pute settlement could appease social emotions related to this topic. 
5. The position of the EU and the USA in the global foreign direct 
investment
The EU and the USA have the leading position in the both global FDI inward and 
global FDI outward stocks. The EU accounted for 35.2% and 40.3% of the global 
inward and global outward stock respectively in 2014. In turn, the USA accounted 
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for 20.8% and 24.4 % of the global inward and global outward stock respective‑
ly (UNCTAD data base and own calculations). The comparison with main com‑
petitors shows that the dominant position of the EU and USA in the global econo‑
my is unquestionable. China and Hong Kong/China accounted together for 10.2% 
of the global FDI inward stock and 8.5% of the global FDI outward stock, and Ja‑
pan – for 4.6% of the global FDI outward stock. Foreign direct investment in Japan 
is traditionally of less importance (UNCTAD data base and own calculations).
Both the EU and the USA have been net exporters of capital in the form 
of FDI, except for the USA in 2010. Graphs 1 and 2 illustrate the position of the 
analyzed partners in international business in comparison with their main com‑
petitors in the years 1990–2014 .
Graph 1. FDI inward stock, the EU, USA and their main competitors, 1990–2010–2014, USD Million 
Source: UNCTAD and own elaboration.
Graph 2. FDI outward stock, the EU, USA and their main competitors, 1990–2010–2014
Source: UNCTAD and own elaboration. 
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6. Geographical distribution of FDI outward stocks of the EU–28  
and the USA
FDI outward stock of the EU–28 were located mainly in the United States at the 
end of 2014, i.e. 34.5% of the total. The main EU–28 holders of FDI stocks in the 
United States were the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The second main 
destination of the EU outward stocks was Switzerland. This country accounted 
for 11% of the EU outward stocks and the main activity of European investors was 
financial intermediation. The third main partner for the EU–27 was Brazil, with 
a 6% share of EU–28 FDI outward stock, having overtaken Canada. In Asia, the 
main location for EU–28 outward FDI stocks were Hong Kong, Singapore and 
China, together accounting for almost half of the EU–28’s FDI positions in Asia 
at the end of 2014 (Eurostat 2016). 
The main locations for the US FDI outward stock at the end of 2012 were the 
EU, accounting for 44% of the total, Canada – accounting for 7%, Latin Amer‑
ica – for 6%, Japan and Switzerland – each accounting for 3% (OECD 2014 and 
own calculations).
The above quoted data show that the EU and the USA constitute important 
partners to each other in the field of capital movements in the form of FDI. In‑
vestment protection measures should be a subject of common concern for them. 
Among the EU Member States, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Luxem‑
bourg and Ireland are the most attractive for US FDI investors. They account‑
ed for 82% of FDI outward stock located in the EU. US FDI outward stock in the 
new EU Member States amounted to 1.2% of that located in the whole EU (OECD 
2014 and own calculations). 
7. Dynamics of FDI flows into and out of the EU and the USA
Annual FDI flows into and out of the analyzed regions during the crisis and 
post‑crisis periods show a decrease in foreign direct investors’ activities in the 
years 2009–2014 (see Graph No 3). UNCTAD’s preliminary estimates indicated 
that FDI flows to developed countries bounced back sharply in 2015, nevertheless, 
the outlook for 2016 was perceived as ‘cloudy’ (UNCTAD 2016).
The bilateral FDI relationships between the EU and the USA, measured using 
FDI intensity indexes, show that investment connections between the partners were 
relatively strong in 2012 (with FDI intensity indexes higher than 1). Nevertheless, 
there is a potential for intensification of FDI between these partners (Czarny, Fol‑
fas 2016, pp. 31–46).
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Graph 3. FDI flows into and out of the EU and the USA, 2007–2015, USD Million 
Source: UNCTAD data base and own elaboration. 
US direct investors showed differentiated interests in their investments in par‑
ticular EU countries in the years 2008–2012 (see Graph 4). American investors 
preferred the so‑called ‘old EU Member States’ and traditional partners (the Neth‑
erlands, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Ireland). US FDI in France and Ger‑
many was relatively moderate and US FDI flows into the new EU Member States 
were negligible. In the latter case some divestment occurred as well.
Graph 4. US outward FDI in the selected countries of the EU, 2008–2012, USD Million
Source: OECD data base and own elaboration.
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The low interest of American investors in investing in the new EU Member 
States might be explained by the following factors: 
• The less attractive locational advantages of the new EU Member States (less 
developed economies than the ‘old’ ones, relatively small markets, and a more 
expensive labour force than in developing countries);
• Less certain conditions for investment and more potential conflicts between 
investors and states (the Czech Republic and Poland being among the most 
frequent respondent States under ISDS arbitrage procedures);
• The dominant presence of investors from the ‘old’ EU Member States in the 
economies of the new EU Member States (for example, in Poland, 91.5% 
of FDI inward stocks came from other EU countries);
• The occurrence of strong investment reorganization and rationalization effects 
under the customs union between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU Member States;
• In this context, potential investment creation and diversion effects under the 
TTIP agreement might be moderate in the new EU countries.
8. Conclusions
1. Although the negotiations between the USA and the EU have been sus‑
pended after the most recent presidential election in the USA3, the problem 
of ISDS within the TTIP Agreement should be perceived in the broader con‑
text of a tendency towards modernization of IIAs and termination of some 
of the BITs undertaken by different countries.
2. The growing number of ISDS cases in the world economy should be treat‑
ed as a rather natural process when the simultaneous growth of FDI flows 
and stocks are taken into account. Nevertheless, the leading position of US 
investors as claimants under ISDS procedures might suggest that American 
companies are able to protect their interests better than investors from other 
countries. This might fuel some public fears in Europe that states would not 
be able to overcome a ‘regulatory chill’.
3. The proposals of the European Commission to change the investment pro‑
tection system can be treated as an attempt to make the system of arbitration 
more transparent, convincing to societies, and safer for states. 
3 See: Decision of the President of the European Commission on the setting up of a Com‑
missioners’ Group on Trade and Harnessing Globalisation, replacing the Commissioners’ Group 
on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the United States, AGENDA of the 
2204th meeting of the Commission, 14 March 2017, European Commission Secretariat General 
OJ(2017) 2204 Final.
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4. The potential effects of the TTIP agreement for FDI between both partners 
might be dependent on the scale of trade creation and diversion effects and the 
mirror effects of investment creation and diversion under a free trade area. 
5. It could be predicted that the potential benefits of the TTIP Agreement in the field 
of FDI flows would be rather limited for the new EU Member States, although 
one might expect an enhancement of some of their locational advantages. 
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Streszczenie
IMPLIKACJE TRANSATLANTYCKIEGO PARTNERSTWA 
W DZIEDZINIE HANDLU I INWESTYCJI (TTIP)  
DLA PRZEPŁYWÓW INWESTYCJI MIĘDZY  
UNIĄ EUROPEJSKĄ A USA
Transatlantyckie Porozumienie w dziedzinie Handlu i Inwestycji (TTIP) jest przedmiotem 
kontrowersji, ale jednocześnie postrzegane jest jako jedno najbardziej wszechstronnych 
międzynarodowych porozumień o wolnym handlu i ochronie inwestycji. Wśród tema‑
tów wywołujących najwięcej krytyki ze strony różnych grup społecznych jest procedury 
rozstrzygania sporów między inwestorem a państwem (ISDS), jak również ich prawne 
konsekwencje dla krajów członkowskich UE. Mniej dyskutowaną kwestią są natomiast 
potencjalne implikacje porozumienia dla ekonomicznej współpracy między Unią Europej‑
ską a USA w dziedzinie przepływów inwestycji, a szczególności bezpośrednich inwestycji 
zagranicznych (BIZ). Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie dyskusji dotyczącej ISDS i zba‑
danie wybranych ekonomicznych, politycznych i prawnych implikacji postanowień TTIP 
dla przepływów BIZ między partnerami. Propozycja Komisji Europejskiej, aby zmienić 
procedury ochrony inwestycji i rozstrzygania sporów, może być traktowana jako próba 
stworzenia bardziej transparentnego systemu, akceptowalnego dla różnych grup społecz‑
nych i bezpieczniejszego dla państw członkowskich. Efekty porozumienia dla BIZ między 
UE a USA mogą zależeć od efektów kreacji i przesunięcia handlu oraz „lustrzanych” 
efektów w sferze inwestycji.
Słowa kluczowe: Transatlantyckie Porozumienie w dziedzinie Handlu i Inwestycji 
(TTIP), rozstrzyganie sporów między inwestorem a państwem (ISDS), bezpośrednie 
inwestycje zagraniczne (BIZ), USA, UE
